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Abstract
The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reduc-
tions of budget deﬁcits is that they are very costly for the governments which
implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the
present paper, instead, we ﬁnd no evidence that governments which quickly reduce
budget deﬁcits are systematically voted out of oﬃce in a sample of 19 OECD coun-
tries from 1975 to 2008. We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality,
namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement
ﬁscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of oﬃc e" d e s p i t e "h a v i n gr e -
duced the deﬁcits. In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce
deﬁcits decisively avoiding an electoral defeat.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of
budget deﬁcits (which we label "ﬁscal adjustments") is that they are the kiss of death
for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following
elections. In certain countries spending cuts are very unpopular, in others tax increases
are politically more costly but everywhere, the story goes, ﬁscal rigor is always unpopular.
The empirical evidence on this point is much less clear cut than the conviction with
which this conventional wisdom is held. In the present paper, in fact, we ﬁnd no evidence
that governments which reduce budget deﬁcits even decisively are systematically voted
out of oﬃce. We also take into consideration as carefully as possible issues of reverse
causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can im-
plement ﬁscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of oﬃce "despite" having
reduced the deﬁcits. Even taking this possibility into account we still ﬁnd no evidence
that ﬁscal adjustments, even decisive ones, systematically, on average, imply electoral
defeats.
In the present paper our focus is especially in large ﬁscal adjustments, which are
currently at the center of attention in many OECD countries. As a motivation we begin
by examining the evidence on the ten largest multi-year ﬁscal adjustments in the last
30 years in OECD countries. We ﬁnd no evidence that the turnover of governments in
those periods was signiﬁcantly higher than the average of the entire sample. In fact it
was lower.1We then explore more systematically all cases of large adjustments (deﬁned
as a reduction of at least 1.5 per cent of GDP of cyclically adjusted deﬁcits). Once
1Obviously there is some arbitrariness in how to deﬁne 10 "largest" adjustments, but the result on
their political consequences hold regardless of which (reasonable) deﬁnition is used.
1again we ﬁnd no evidence of a negative eﬀect on election prospects. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, we ﬁnd some evidence that ﬁscally loose government tend to lose
election more often than average, a result which is consistent with Brander and Drazen
(2008). Next, we present a battery of regressions which show that indeed these results
are quite robust and the data do not exhibit any correlation between deﬁcit reduction
and electoral losses.
But what about reverse causality? Perhaps weak governments, knowing their vulner-
ability, do not implement adjustments, but then, precisely because they are weak, they
loose at polls, and the reverse holds for strong governments. This would explain the
lack of correlation between ﬁscal adjustments and reelection. Unfortunately measuring
the "strength" of a government is not easy; often such strength or weakness depends on
personalities involved, leadership style etc. which are impossible for the econometrician
to observe and measure. For instance, in principle a coalition government may be weaker
and more unstable than a single party government, but certain coalitions may be espe-
cially cohesive and certain single party government may hide strong division within the
same party. The margin of the majority of the government in the legislature may be an
other indicator, but that too could be imperfect, due for instance, to divisions within
the government coalition even though the latter may have a large majority of seats. We
ﬁnd no evidence of a diﬀerent behavior in terms of ﬁscal adjustments of coalition versus
single party governments. At the very least we can conclude that many governments
can tackle decisively budget deﬁcits without electoral losses. Perhaps not all, but a good
portion can.2
If it is the case that ﬁscal adjustments do not lead systematically to electoral defeats
why do they often seem so politically diﬃcult? We can think of two explanations. The
ﬁrst one is simply risk aversion. Incumbent governments may be afraid of "rocking the
boat" and follow a cautious course of actions and postpone ﬁscal reforms. The second and
perhaps more plausible one is that the political game played around a ﬁscal adjustment
goes above and beyond a one man one vote elections. Alesina and Drazen (1991) present
a model in which organized groups with a strong inﬂuence on the polity manage to
postpone reforms, even when the latter are necessary and unavoidable, to try to switch
the costs on their opponents. The resulting wars of attrition delays ﬁscal adjustments.
Strikes, contributions from various lobbies, press campaigns are all means which can
enforce (or block) policies above and beyond voting at the polls. For example imagine
a public sector union that goes on strike to block reduction in government spending on
the public wage bill. They may create disruptions and may have consequences which
may be too costly to bear for a government. Not only, but public sector unions may
have connections with parts of the incumbent coalition and block ﬁscal adjustments.
Similar considerations may lead to postponements of pension reforms. In many countries
pensioners developed a strong political support even within workers’ unions. The latter
would then water down the adjustment to placate this particular lobby even though the
"median voter" might have been favorable to the tighter ﬁscal policy. To put it more
broadly, voting in elections is not the only way in which various lobbies and pressure
groups can inﬂuence the political process. Alesina, Ardagna and Trebbi (2006) present
a battery of tests on electoral reform in large sample of countries which are consistent
with the empirical implications of the war of attrition model.
The paper closest to the present one in spirit is Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998).
These authors, using data up to the mid nineties, found inconclusive evidence on the ef-
fects of ﬁscal adjustments on reelections in OECD economies. Buti et al. (2010) ﬁnd that
chances of reelection for the incumbent governments are, controlling for other factors,
2See Bonﬁglioli and Gancia (2010) for a model based upon politicians’ competence in which certain
but not all governments implement ﬁscal reforms and those which do are reelected.
2not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by their record of pro-market reforms3 . A related literature is
the one on political budget cycles which asks the question of whether incumbent govern-
ments increase spending or cut taxes before elections in order to be rewarded at the polls,
an argument which implies that budget deﬁcits are popular and budget cuts are not.4
Persson and Tabellini (2000) suggested that only in certain types of electoral systems
political budget cycles are present. However Brander and Drazen (2005) show in fact
that while political budget cycles are common in new democracies (like in Central and
Eastern Europe) they are not the norm in established one, where increases in deﬁcits
tend to reduce the electoral success for the incumbents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂyd e s c r i b eo u r
data. Section 3 presents some suggestive qualitative evidence on the largest multi year
ﬁscal adjustments in the OECD countries in the last 30 years. Section 4 discusses more
formally the correlations between deﬁcit reduction policies and electoral results. Section
5 addresses the question of potential reverse causality. In Section 6 we look at some case
studies to further illustrate the link between ﬁscal adjustment and re-election prospects.
The last section concludes.
2D a t a
Our data sources are standard. For economic variables we use OECD Economic Outlook
Database no.84. For political-institutional variables we use the Database of Political
Institutions (DPI) 2009. In particular we focus on the period 1975-2008. The countries
are the members of the OECD which have been such for the entire period; the ones we
analysed in our work are 19: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
The precise deﬁnition of all our variables is extensively described in Appendix, but
for ease of exposition we also redeﬁne them as we encounter them in the paper. Specif-
ically, all the variables corrected for the cycle are calculated using the cyclical adjusted
variables of OECD Economic Outlook Database, and variation of cyclical adjusted vari-
ables are calculated over the potential output of total economy. In particular we used
OECD reviewed and revised estimation methods. In order to provide a single measure
of potential output, the chosen measure is "one which represents the levels of real GDP,
and associated rates of growth, which are sustainable over the medium term at a stable
rate of inﬂation" (Giorno et al., 1995). Our results are virtually identical if instead by
dividing by potential GDP we divide by actual GDP. Fortunately the qualitative nature
of our results is unaﬀected by the deﬁnition used.
3 The 10 Largest Fiscal Adjustments
We begin with some suggestive evidence regarding the ten largest ﬁscal adjustments
in our sample. In Table 1 we report in order of cumulative size, the ten largest ones
identiﬁed as follows: the ten cases in which the cumulative cyclically adjusted deﬁcit
reductions obtained by summing consecutive years of deﬁcit reductions is the largest.
3In Buti et al. (2008) the empirical evidence also suggests that well-functioning and developed
ﬁnancial markets positively aﬀect the reelection probability of reformist governments. It seems to suggest
that ﬁnancial market reforms facilitate reforms in product and labour markets.
Buti and van den Noord (2004a) and (2004b) also found the empirical evidence of political business
cycle in the early years of EMU. These results suggests that electoral manipulation of ﬁscal policy in
EU countries has not been curbed by EMU’s ﬁscal policy rules.
4See Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Drazen (2004).
3Obviously one could think of alternative deﬁnitions but our qualitative results do not
change. For instance we obtained very similar ﬁndings using a classiﬁcation of the largest
multi year ﬁscal adjustments used by Alcidi and Gros (2010).
Many of the episodes listed in our Table 1 have been made "famous" by a lively
literature which has investigated the economic characteristic and degree of success of
these episodes.5 In addition to the size of the adjustments in terms of deﬁcit reduction
we also report measures of the composition of the adjustment arising from spending cuts
and tax increases over GDP. We calculate this variable by dividing the share of spending
cuts over the reductions of ﬁscally adjusted deﬁcits (in shares of potential GDP). Note
that the spending share can be greater than 100 if taxes were actually cut during the
adjustment or can be negative if spending was increased. We focus on this variable since
the evidence shows that spending based ﬁscal adjustments have been more long lasting
and more successful in achieving ﬁscal balance with lower costs in terms of lost growth.6
With "termination" we imply that there was an election in the period of the adjustments
and/or in the two years following the end of it. We include the two years after the end of
the ﬁscal adjustment because the results of an election within two years after the end of
the period of deﬁcit reduction could be aﬀected by the tight ﬁscal policy quite directly.
Beyond two years too much time may have elapsed to attribute reelection (or defeat)
mainly to the ﬁscal adjustment. In any event our results do not quantitatively change if
we include all terminations following the last year of the ﬁscal adjustments, even beyond
two years. The last column, labelled "change in ideology" indicates how many changes
in the political orientation occur during the ﬁscal adjustment and in the two years which
followed its end.
Table 1 shows that government changes occurred in 7 cases out of 19 terminations,
thus they were about 37 percent of the total. But if we look at the ﬁve largest ad-
justments in cumulative size, the ratio decreases considerably, as changes in government
occurred only in 1 case out of 10. On the contrary, there were about 40 percent of
government changes over the total number of terminations from 1975 to 2008 for the
countries sampled in the table, indicating that periods of large ﬁscal adjustments were
not associated with sistematically higher government turnover.
Secondly the table allows us to make some preliminary observations about the link
between cabinet change and the composition of ﬁscal adjustments. Considering the
percentage of the adjustment due to cut in expenditures, and comparing the ﬁve ﬁscal
adjustments for which the value was highest with the remaining adjustments, we ﬁnd that
the cases in which the expenditure share of the adjustment was higher were associated
with less frequent change in government. In the table below, if we pool together data
for Ireland (1986-89), Canada (1993-97), Finland (1993-98), Belgium (1982-1987) an
Sweden (1994-2000), we get that government change occurred only in 20 percent of cases.
Instead, for the rest of the countries considered, government changed in 56 percent of
cases. This ﬁrst evidence seems to suggest that tax-based adjustments make it more
diﬃcult for incumbent governments to be reappointed when they implement large ﬁscal
adjustments.
5See the original contribution by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). The most recent paper in this line
which also summarizes the previous literature is Alesina and Ardagna (2010).
6Al o n gl i s to fp a p e r so nﬁscal adjustments has reached this conclusion. The latest in this series
is Alesina and Ardagna (2010). This paper also includes a review of the previous literature. Using a
diﬀerent methodology IMF(2010) also shows that spending based adjustments are less costly than tax
based ones.
44D e ﬁcit Reductions and Elections
4.1 Simple Statistics
We now turn to a more systematic analysis of deﬁcit reduction policies in OECD coun-
tries. We deﬁne a year of "large ﬁscal adjustment" one in which the cyclically adjusted
deﬁcit over potential GDP ratio fell by more than 1.5 per cent of GDP while a year of
"ﬁscal adjustment" is one in which the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit over potential GDP ra-
tio falls by any amount. Thus, large ﬁscal adjustments are a subset of all the adjustments.
Fiscal expansions are deﬁned identically to ﬁscal adjustments but with the opposite sign.
With the deﬁnition of a "large ﬁscal adjustment", and given that the deﬁcit is cycli-
cally adjusted, one tries to capture years in which ﬁscal policy was decisively contrac-
tionary with, most likely, active discretionary ﬁscal policies which were not business as
usual or the result of the cycle. When we use the cyclically adjusted deﬁnition of pri-
mary deﬁcit (COCHDEF), we ﬁnd 294 years (over 646 total) of ﬁscal adjustments and
60 years of "large" ﬁscal adjustments in our sample. We have more years of large ﬁscal
adjustments if we consider not potential but actual GDP at the denominators of the
ratios, but our results on the electoral consequences are completely unchanged.7
In this section we examine the link between the timing of ﬁscal adjustments and the
timing of changes in government. In order to measure "changes of government" we use
two variables, one is all changes of a Prime Minister (ALLCH), the other one is change
of the Prime Minister and in the party composition of the government (IDEOCH).8
The ﬁrst variable may overestimate "change", since a new Prime Minister with the same
party or coalition may simply be a routine personnel replacement in a stable and reelected
government. The variable IDEOCH may underestimate political turnover because even
without a change in the party composition of the government, a Prime Minister may
be changed because he/she may have become unpopular possibly as a result of a ﬁscal
tightening.
Another data complication relates to the timing of government change. The issue
can be summarized as follows: if the government termination occurs in the ﬁr s tp a r to f
year t, should we consider the ﬁscal variable at time t as before or after the termination?
If for example we were associating a change in government in the ﬁrst part of year t
with a reduction in deﬁcit over GDP in year t, we could erroneously conclude that the
change in government occured as a result of the ﬁscal adjustment, although the ﬁscal
adjustment could have been largely implemented in the second half of year t, after the
elections. Hence, we adopt the same rule used in Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998):
every termination that occurs between July 1 of year t and June 30 of year t+1 is
considered to fall in calendar year t and is thought as contemporaneous to the ﬁscal
outcomes of year t. Terminations that occured in the ﬁr s tp a r to fe a c hy e a ra r ei n s t e a d
considered as contemporaneous to the ﬁscal variables of the previous year.
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the frequency of ALLCH and IDEOCH in the election
year against cyclically adjusted deﬁcit reductions of diﬀerent sizes and ﬁscal expansions
in the three years before the election, and we do not ﬁnd evidence that ﬁscal adjustments
a r ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hm o r ef r e q u e n tc h a n g e sin government or prime minister. Figure 1
investigates the frequency of change in government and/or prime minister (ALLCH). The
left-hand set of bars in the ﬁgure indicates the frequency of change when the adjustment
takes place one year before the election. The ﬁrst two bars from the left show the average
value of ALLCH when there is a ﬁscal adjustment and a ﬁscal expansion. There is a
7This explains why with this method of dividing by potential GDP we identify slightly fewer large
adjustments than in Alesina and Ardagna (2010).
8Excluding from the count of ALLCH the cases in which term limits were binding, like the second
term of an American President, leave our results unchanged.
5slightly higher propensity for a government turnover after a ﬁscal expansion, even though
the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant; the third and fourth bar show equivalent
statistics but divide ﬁscal adjustments by size. They seem to show that large adjustments
one year before the elections are associated with lower propensity to government changes.
The same picture emerges when we consider adjustment two years before the elections.
In Figure 2 we consider only government changes, deﬁned as changes in the political
orientation of the government (IDEOCH). Figure 2 provides comparable results to Figure
1, except for the fact that the dependent variable is now IDEOCH instead of ALLCH.
This ﬁgure does not show that incumbent governments are systematically voted out of
oﬃce when they implement deﬁcit reductions. The results we get in Figure 2 are similar
to those we got in Figure 1, as they show that ﬁscal expansions (i.e. increases in deﬁcits)
are on average associated with higher government change than ﬁscal adjustments.
Figure 3 sheds some light on the relationship between the composition of the adjust-
ment and government turnover. We label large adjustments as expenditure based when
spending cuts are greater than the median spending cut of all large ﬁscal adjustments.
They are tax-based if the increase in tax revenues is greater than the median tax increase
of all large ﬁscal adjustments. Consistently with the preliminary evidence provided in
the ﬁrst part of this paper, Figure 3 shows that if a large ﬁscal adjustment is expenditure-
based, it is less likely that there will be a government change than if the deﬁcit reduction
is tax-based. This result holds both when we look at ALLCH and IDEOCH.
4.2 Regression Analysis
In this section we run several regressions which try to predict the likelihood or reap-
pointment of an incumbent government as a function of several political and economic
variables, including changes in the deﬁcit, taxes and spending. The bottom line of these
regressions is that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd any economic variable (with the possible exception
of inﬂation) which is sistematically and robustly correlated with the probability of a gov-
ernment defeat in a election. This holds as well for ﬁscal variables: we ﬁnd no evidence
that spending cuts, tax increases and deﬁcit reduction policies make it more likely for
incumbents to loose.
Our interpretation is that political change is the result of a complex political game
and it is hard to pin point stable correlations between economic variables and electoral
results.9The important point of our purpose here is precisely that a ﬁscal adjustment
is only one of the many components of such political dynamics and it is not a "deal
breaker" so that no matter what else is happening it implies an electoral defeat. If that
w e r et h ec a s ew es h o u l dﬁnd a correlation between the occurence of ﬁscal adjustments
and electoral losses.
We have tried many speciﬁcations of our probit regression in which the left hand side
variables are measures of government changes. We ﬁrst adopted the same speciﬁcation
by Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) and then we explored many others. We ﬁrst
report probit regressions with the variable measuring cabinet change (IDEOCH) as our
dependent variable. To study the impact of ﬁscal adjustments on cabinet change, and
to test for the robustness of our results, we use three diﬀerent measures: the change
in non-cyclically adjusted deﬁcit (CHDEF), the change in cyclically adjusted deﬁcit
(COCHDEF) and the average change in deﬁcit during the tenure of the current cabinet
(TOTCHDEF). In our baseline speciﬁcation, we also include macroeconomic variables
such as the change in real GDP (dGDP), the change in unemployment rate (dUNR) and
the inﬂation rate (INFL). We then use political variables to control for three diﬀerent
9For the case of the US in a series of papers Fair (1978,1982,1988) argued that the rate of growth of
the economy a few quarters before the election is a critical determinant of presidential elections. For a
discussion of this evidence see Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
6characteristics of the cabinet: the number of year the cabinet has been in power (DU-
RAT), whether it is composed of a coalition of parties (COAL) and whether it has the
majority in the parliament (MAJ).
Table 2 presents the results of our baseline speciﬁcation. It shows that the deﬁcit
variables are not statistically signiﬁcant irrespective of the measure we use, suggesting
that governments implementing ﬁscal tightening are on average not penalized at the
following election. INFL (the inﬂation rate) is statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions.
It seems that voters are especially averse to inﬂation. Brander and Drazen (2008) ﬁnd
a similar result for a diﬀerent (larger) set of countries and a diﬀerent (earlier) time
period. The coeﬃcients on the other macroeconomic variables are of the sign one would
expect, but they are not statistically signiﬁcant in many speciﬁcations. They show that
an increase in the growth rate of real GDP reduces the probability of a government
change, whereas the unemployment rate has a really small coeﬃcient. The signs of the
coeﬃcients on political variables are also generally consistent with conventional wisdom,
although only DURAT is statistically signiﬁcant. As we would expect, the probability
of government change increases with the lenght of its tenure.
In Table 3 we extend this baseline speciﬁcation by including variables in deviation
from the weighted average of G7 countries.10 Thus we use GDP growth, inﬂation rate
and unemployment rate in deviations from G7 average in every year. The motivation is
clear: we test whether voters punish government not for their performance per se but
with respect to its performance relative to the "world average". As before, we do not
ﬁnd evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant relation between the change in ﬁscal deﬁcit and
government change in the direction predicted by the conventional wisdom. No coeﬃcients
on deﬁcit variables are statistically signiﬁcant, as in table 2. Once again this result is
fully consistent with those found by Brander and Drazen (2008). Also when we look
at macroeconomic and political variables, our results do not vary substantially from the
ones obtained in the previous speciﬁcation.
In Table 4 we use the same speciﬁcations as before but run the regressions only on
deﬁcit reduction years. Regressions on this restricted sample allow us to check for the
robustness of the results we obtained while considering the full sample, and to assess if the
sample of ﬁscal adjustment years diﬀers signiﬁcantly. The estimated coeﬃcients on the
variables measuring the change of public deﬁcit are not substantially diﬀerent from those
obtained in the previous set of regressions. They are not statistically signiﬁcant except
for CHREV, whose eﬀect on IDEOCH is positive, meaning that a positive change in the
size of the public revenue increases the probability of government change. Thus, even
when we restrict the analysis to deﬁcit reduction years, there is no evidence that ﬁscal
tightening harms incumbent governments by reducing the probability of their reelection.
Coeﬃcients on macroeconomic and political variables do not diﬀer from the previous
set of regressions either, showing that in most regressions only the duration of tenure
(DURAT) has a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on IDEOCH. As before, the results
are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring deviations of macroeconomic variables
from G7 countries’ weighted average values.
In Table 5 we include the variables which control for the composition of the ﬁscal
adjustment. Also we check whether adjustments based on cuts in transfer-payments
or in government-wage consumption are associated with a higher probability of cabinet
changes. We focus on large adjustments (those such that deﬁcit to GDP is cut by
more than 1.5 percentage points from t-1 to t) and add four variables to control for the
composition of the adjustment, namely PEXP, PTAX, PTRF and PCGW: the share
of adjustment on total expenditure, total revenues, transfers and government wages
respectively. We focus on transfers and wages because results by Alesina Perotti and
10Weights for each country are calculated using real GDP.
7Tavares (1998) suggested that these were the most successful adjustments in terms of a
long lasting solubilization of the debt/GDP ratio. They may also be the least popular,
at least according to the conventional wisdom.
Although we get statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for all variables of ﬁscal com-
position, it is worth spending some more words on the sign of the coeﬃcients associated
with the variables. The sign of the coeﬃcient on PEXP, a dummy variable equal to one
if the adjustment is large and expenditure based, is negative, meaning that if an adjust-
ment is large and expenditure-based it is associated with a reduction in the probability
of a change of government. Similarly, if we look at PTAX, a dummy variable equal to
one if the adjustment is large and tax-based, we get a positive coeﬃcient, meaning that it
is more likely that there will be a government change if the deﬁcit reduction is based on
an increase in taxes. We then analyze PTRF and PCGW, dummy variables associated
with large adjustments based on cuts in transfer payments and government-wage con-
sumption respectively. For both variables we get negative and statistically insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients, which suggests that if the adjustment is based on cuts in these categories
of expenditure, it is less likely that the government will change. When we repeat the
analysis using cyclically adjusted deﬁcit (COCHDEF) we obtain similar results11.
Finally, if we repeat the same analysis with ALLCH as the dependent variables, we
ﬁnd very similar evidence for variables measuring the change in ﬁscal deﬁcit. All these
results are available from the authors. While the coeﬃcients on macroeconomic and
political variables are left unchanged in most of the cases, there are small diﬀerences
in the coeﬃcients on ﬁscal deﬁc i tv a r i a b l e s . W h e nw er u nt h es a m es p e c i ﬁcation of
Table 2 on ALLCH, results are analogous as before. Similarly, when we run the same
regressions only on ﬁscal adjustments years (as we did in Table 4), we get that only
the coeﬃcient on TOTCHDEF is diﬀerent: although it is positive as before, it is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Lastly, to check the robustness of our results, we run a battery of regressions using
logit model and logit ﬁxed eﬀects model, in which we control for country ﬁxed eﬀects
(Table 6). The estimations we get are not substantially diﬀerent from the ones we get in
our probit speciﬁcation. In particular using the same speciﬁcation of Table 2 and Table
3 the estimations obtained using a logit ﬁxed eﬀects model are consistent with previous
results. The evidence suggest that DURAT is positive and statistically signiﬁcant while
INFL is almost always positive but not statistically signiﬁcant in all the speciﬁcations.
Once again, none of the deﬁcit variables are statistically signiﬁcant.
5 Reverse Causality
Thus far we uncovered no evidence suggesting that governments which engage in even
large ﬁscal adjustments are systematically voted out of oﬃce. A question which comes
to mind is one of a sort of "reverse causation." Perhaps those governments which are
"strong" are those which can safely engage in ﬁscal adjustments and they are then reap-
pointed "despite" having been ﬁscally responsible. Note that the question is not whether
or not "stronger" government implement more ﬁscal adjustments (an issue studied by
Alesina Ardagna and Trebbi (2006)) but whether stronger governments which imple-
ment ﬁscal adjustments are more likely to be reelected than weaker governments which
implement ﬁscal adjustments. In other words, a weaker government may have a harder
time breaking some impediment to implement reforms, but once it does it, the question
is whether it suﬀers more at the polls than a stronger government.
The diﬃculty is how to deﬁne, ex ante, i.e. before reelection (or loss) what a "strong"
government is, in a way which is measurable by the econometricians. Our ﬁrst measure of
11Those estimates are not reported in the paper but they are available on request.
8strength is whether or not the ruling government is formed by a coalition of parties. The
idea is that coalition governments are more likely to suﬀer from internal disagreements
(for decisions that include the nature and size of ﬁscal adjustments to be implemented)
and they may be more likely to fall. The evidence does indeed suggest that the average
duration of coalition governments is slightly shorter than single party government. In our
sample coalition governments last on average 4.12 years while single party governments
last 4.20 years. Besides, if we look at the frequency of government change, we ﬁnd that
the probability of cabinet change is slightly higher (0.38) when a coalition government
is in power at election time than when a single party government in charge (0.34).
Results are consistent when we analyze the "strength" of a government in terms of the
share of votes they received at the election and not in terms of the composition of the
executive. Obviously the duration of a government is endogenous to policy choices,
therefore coalitions may choose certain policies which are less likely to be unpopular,
which is precisely the point debated here.
Our second measure of government stability is a dummy variable equal to one if the
party of the executive has an absolute majority in the house(s) with lawmaking powers.
This measure seems reasonable since one would expect a government to last longer if it
has the majority in all houses. In fact we ﬁnd that when this is the case (as measured by
the variable MAJ), the government lasts on average 4.41 years, whereas for the rest of the
observations the average duration is 4.17 years. However, diﬀerently from the evidence
presented for the coalition variable, we get that governments holding the majority in the
houses are more likely to change than the rest (45 percent of cases versus 34).
We can then proceed and use the variables deﬁned above to investigate the main issue
of this section: are more stable governments more likely to implement ﬁscal adjustments?
Do they do so because they are more likely to be reappointed “despite” they have been
ﬁscally responsible?
Our results show that coalition governments implemented 164 ﬁscal adjustments,
corresponding to roughly 47 percent of total observations for which we had a coalition
government, whereas single party governments implemented 130 ﬁscal adjustments, i.e.
they did it in 51 percent of the years in which they were governing. If we only look at
"large" ﬁscal adjustments results are similar with previous ones. Coalition governments
implemented 34 large ﬁscal adjustments, corresponding to roughly 9.8 percent of total
observations for which we had a coalition government, whereas single party governments
implemented 26 ﬁscal adjustments, that is to say 10.3 percent of the years in which they
were governing. If we then look at the stability of the government as measured by the
majority in the houses, we ﬁnd similar diﬀerences between governments with an absolute
majority and government without an absolute majority in the houses when we look at
large ﬁscal adjustments.The former implemented large adjustments in 10.2 percent of
cases, the latter in 10.1 percent of cases. When instead we look at all adjustments the
diﬀerence is not so clear cut. Governments with the majority implemented 62 ﬁscal
adjustments, which represent 48.8 percent of the years where a government with an
absolute majority was in charge. Government without the majority implemented 229
ﬁscal adjustments, about 49.2 percent of the total (the results are reported in Table 7).
So according to our, admittedly imperfect, measure of "strength" it seems that "strong"
governments implement ﬁscal adjustments only slightly more often than average.
Moreover the evidence provided in ﬁgures 4 to 7 does not always suggest that more
stable governments implementing ﬁscal adjustments before the election were more likely
to be reappointed. For example ﬁgure 5 shows that if single party governments imple-
mented ﬁscal adjustments (in particular small ones) three years before the election they
were more likely not to be reelected than if coalition governments did so. Similarly,
governments with an absolute majority in the houses were associated with government
9change in 41 percent of cases if they implemented ﬁscal adjustments one year before the
election, compared to 30 percent in the rest of our sample (see ﬁgure 7).
The idea that more stable governments are not more protected from government
change after they perfom a ﬁscal adjustment is also supported by the set of regressions
we show in Tables 8 and 9. We add interaction variables to the baseline speciﬁcation
described above and try to capture the speciﬁce ﬀect on government change associated
with more stable governments implementing ﬁscal adjustments. Even in this speciﬁ-
cation there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between coalition and single party
governments implementing ﬁscal adjustments on the prospect of being reelected. In col-
umn 4 of table 8, where we use a cyclically adjusted deﬁcit variable, we do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between coalition and single party governments. Simi-
larly in column 6, when we construct a variable interacting TOTCHDEF and COAL, we
do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of this variable on the dependent variable
IDEOCH.
The evidence that "stronger" governments are not necessarily more protected from
electoral turnover is also supported by our results in Table 9. In all speciﬁcations where
we include an interaction variable between the deﬁcit variable and a dummy for the gov-
ernment having majority support in the parliament, we don’t get statistically signiﬁcant
estimates for the coeﬃcients on the interaction variable.
5.1 Discussion
If it is the case that certain types of ﬁscal adjustments are not necessarily costly in
terms of lost output or lost votes, why are they often delayed and politicians reluctant
to implement them?
There are two possible, related reasons. The ﬁr s ti st h a t“ v o t e - c o u n t i n g ”i sn o tt h e
only political factor at play. Certain constituencies may be able to “block” adjustments
to continue receiving rents from government spending because they have enough political
energy (time, organization, money). This is sometimes referred to as an issue of diﬀuse
beneﬁts and concentrated costs. For example, in some cases strikes of public-sector em-
ployees may create serious disruptions. Pensioners’ lobbies may be able to persuade
politicians not to touch their pension systems even when future generations will suf-
fer the costs of delayed reforms. Lobbyists for certain protected sectors use campaign
contributions for continued protection.
A second and related problem is what Alesina and Drazen (1990) modeled as a
“war of attrition” political game. Political conﬂicts over the allocation of costs of the
budget cuts or tax increases, for example, lead to a stalemate that requires time to
be resolved. Postponing an adjustment may be costly, but all sides hope to be able
to shield themselves from such costs, and the “war” continues until one side gives in.
Thus, more polarized political systems and fractionalized societies, where “deals” and
compromises are more diﬃcult to reach quickly, should have a harder time stabilizing.
Another implication is that a political consolidation of a stable and secure cohesive
majority may be a precondition for a ﬁscal consolidation. Finally, this model is consistent
with the “crisis hypothesis,” namely that the idea that a sharp deterioration of the
economic situation may lead to reforms. In this case, a ﬁscal consolidation occurs simply
because it becomes too costly to continue to postpone.
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There is great variety of politico- economic features in large ﬁscal adjustments. They are
the result of complex interactions between ﬁscal, macroeconomic, structural reforms and
political variables. In this section we again focus on episodes of large ﬁscal adjustments,
and try to isolate some "interesting" cases. We consider diﬀerent political environments
in order to guarantee the appropriate variety. First we look at Canada in the 1990s, as
it can be taken as an example of "strong" government implementing ﬁscal adjustments.
The Liberal Party’s share of votes in 1993 was really high, with more than 40 percent
of the electors voting for the party. The second case we look at is Finland between 1993
and 1998. This case is completely diﬀerent, given the proportional and very fragmented
political system, in which the government in charge is often a coalition. Thirdly, we focus
on Sweden between 1994 and 2000. The Sweden case has some macroeconomics analogies
with the Finnish one, as both Sweden and Finland went through a severe ﬁnancial crisis
at the beginning of the 90s. They also present some diﬀerences. In Sweden, the Social
Democratic Party had a consensus that lasted longer than in Finland: it took oﬃce in
1994 and started the ﬁscal consolidation just right after the election, holding the majority
until the 2006 elections. Finally we consider the United Kingdom in the 1990s, which
gives us a good example of a situation in which ﬁscal adjustments were implemented but
the government wasn’t re-elected.
The empirical evidence suggests that in the cases of re-elections, the government
suﬀers a small decrease in the share of votes in the election following the consolidation
program, but this does not prevent them from staying in charge (for example in Finland).
In some cases the voters seem to appreciate the consolidation as time goes by, and after
a small decrease in the share of votes, a bigger increase follows (as in Canada).
6.1 Canada 1993-1997: Expenditure-Based Adjustment with Gov-
ernment Re-election
Canada experienced a severe economic downturn in the early 1990s which had a signiﬁ-
cant impact on the country’s budget balance. In 1992 public spending rose well above
50 percent of GDP and the budget deﬁcit increased from 4.6 percent of GDP in 1989
to 9.1 percent in 1992. As a consequence, the public debt-to-GDP ratio grew sharply
to above 100 percent of GDP. The worsening of the overall general government deﬁcit
originated in the deﬁcit of the provinces (Hauptmeier et al. 2006). Moreover other key el-
ements contributed such as the substantial competitive disadvantages that Canada faced
because of high labor costs, low productivity growth rates, and a pronounced exchange
rate appreciation that started in the mid-eighties.
In reaction to these events, in 1993 the Canadian government started an ambitious
austerity program. The success was particularly based on three elements: low and
stable inﬂation, structural reforms, and substantial expenditure reductions. By 1997,
the budget had been balanced. More than 90 percent of the ﬁscal adjustment was due to
spending cuts. The main expenditure measures included "cuts in wages (in particular,
public employee compensation), unemployment beneﬁts, defense spending, health care
services, agricultural and business subsidies, and transfers to provinces and households"
(Leigh et al. 2007). As a result, total and primary expenditures declined by around 3.5
percent of GDP within the ﬁrst two years. In the following years the consolidation path
was continued and led to a total spending decrease by more than 11 percent of GDP
over seven years, compared to the peak it reached in 1992.
On the revenue side some reforms lowered the tax burden and improved the fairness
of the tax system, reducing personal income taxes at the provincial level, increasing
corporate income tax rates, and broadening the base of both. Other measures included
11a wide use of privatizations and a reformation of transfer systems, which beneﬁted both
the budget balance and the supply side of the economy. Some major reforms were also
introduced to increase labor market ﬂexibility and to make the ﬁnancial sector more
competitive and eﬃcient. For instance, the ﬁnancial services sector policy was reviewed
and reformed in the late 1990s.
Traditionally, politically Canada had a two-party system with the Conservative and
Liberal parties dominating the political scene.
Beginning in the 1990s, Canadian national politics became more like of a multi-party
system, even though the Liberal and Conservative parties kept a relatively dominant
role. But in 1993 a total of ﬁve main political parties competed for electoral support,
and an erosion of the command enjoyed by the Liberal and Conservative parties. In 1993
t h eL i b e r a lP a r t yt o o ko ﬃce, running its election campaign explicitly on a platform of
addressing Canada’s ﬁscal issues (the so-called "Red book"). The party was able to win
a strong majority, one of the best results in Canada’s history, after being out of power
since 1984. In the 1993 elections, the party won 177 seats and achieved the third-best
performance in its history, and its best performance since 1949. The Liberal Party was
re-elected with a considerably lower majority in the following general election in 1997,
but nearly tied their 1993 result in the subsequent 2000 election. Chretien became the
only Canadian Prime Minister to win three consecutive majority governments.
6.2 Finland 1993-1998: Expenditure Based Adjustment with
Government Re-election
During the 1980s Finland went through a ﬁnancial liberalization process that led to a
lending boom. The boom was followed by a recession, partially due to the banking
crisis of 1991, and partially due to the deterioration of the terms of trade following
the fall of the Soviet Union, which accounted for 15 to 20 percent of Finland’s foreign
trade. Finland’s real GDP dropped by about 14 percent between 1990 and 1993. By
1994 unemployment had reached nearly 20 percent.12. Government spending over GDP
reached a staggering 65 per cent and the deﬁcit exceeded 7 percent. At the same time,
bailout costs for the banking sector further accelerated the increase in the public debt
ratio.
The government reaction was to enact a substantial ﬁscal adjustment over 6 years,
between 1993 and 1998: the debt over GDP ratio went down of a cumulative 6.2 percent-
age points between 1993 and 1998. We estimate that about 78 percent of the adjustment
was due to expenditure cuts. According to Hauptmeier et al. (2006) there was a 5
percent of GDP reduction in total expenditures over the ﬁrst 2 years of the ﬁscal ad-
justment and that expenditures were reduced by 15 percent to 49 percent of GDP over
seven years. Furthermore in the same period, the ﬁscal balance improved substantially
to achieve a 7 percent surplus by the end of the 1990s. The main expenditure mea-
sures included cuts in social beneﬁts, particularly unemployment beneﬁts, transfers to
municipalities, subsidies, wages, and capital spending. For instance, contractual pay in-
creases were frozen for 4 years starting from 1991, and those measures were accompanied
by moderate wage agreements in the public sector and reductions in public sector em-
ployment levels. The government also implemented broadly revenue-neutral tax reform
raising user fees in health and education, along with increases in payroll taxes and in
employee compensation for social security. Complementary reform measures also helped
the ﬁscal adjustment. For instance, ‘incomes policy agreements’ were implemented on a
biannual basis, contributing to wage stability and low levels of inﬂation. A devaluation
of the exchange rate in 1992 also helped improve the budget balance by beneﬁtting the
12For more details see Honkapohja and Koskela (1999)
12tradable sector. Furthermore, inﬂation targeting at 2 percent contributed to the overall
stability and renewed growth of the economy in the following years.
Finland can be classiﬁed as a case of expenditure-based ﬁscal adjustment with re-
election if we look at the 1999 elections. The result is not as clear-cut as it was for
Canada since there was a change in the Finnish government in the 1995 elections, after
the austerity program had already started. The Finnish political background in the 1990s
can be illustrated as follows. The Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party were
the two main political parties between 1993 and 1998, and both implemented austerity
policies during that period. In 1992, the Centre-Party government elected in 1991 started
a ﬁscal consolidation program based on a new medium-term framework. It lost the
following elections, in April 1995, when the SDP won with 28.3 percent of the votes and
immediately introduced an austerity package. In particular the new social-democratic
government was formed by a ﬁve-party "Rainbow Coalition" and Paavo Lippon en, the
SDP leader, was appointed Prime Minister. The SDP was re-elected in 1999, although
by a very narrow majority, having lost a signiﬁcant share of the votes (5.4 percent)
relative to the previous election. According to election results, there was a strong political
competition among three parties between 1995 and 2003: the SDP, the National Coalition
Party, and the Centre Party, with the latter taking oﬃce again after the 2003 elections.
As in Canada, from electoral results we can see a decrease in votes for the leading political
party during the ﬁscal adjustment. Still, the SDP, which had the majority in 1992, again
had the relative majority in the 1999 elections.
6.3 Sweden 1994-2000: Expenditure-Based Adjustment with Gov-
ernment Re-election
The boom of the 1980s in Sweden was followed by a recession, which was triggered
by the banking crisis of 1991, after the collapse of a real estate bubble. The public
expenditure ratio had increased to 73 percent of GDP in 1993 and public debt had
risen rapidly to over 70 percent of GDP. The budget deﬁcit was at 11.2 percent of GDP
and the unemployment rate at 7.5 percent. In response to these events, the Swedish
government started a ﬁscal consolidation program, which, according to our estimates,
led to a cumulative ﬁscal adjustment of 8.4 percent over 7 years mainly because of
substantial cuts in expenditures. By the end of the year 2000 ther was a 3 per cent of
GDP surplus.
Around 70 percent of the adjustment was based on cuts in expenditures. Central
features of the new budget process, implemented in January 1997, were also a budgetary
process with multi-year expenditure ceilings and a medium-term target for the govern-
ment’s net lending. An expenditure ceiling was imposed in 1996, which limited central
government expenditures and expenditures for the pension system outside the budget
(but did not include interest expenditures). The adjustment covered approximately two-
thirds of the total Swedish general government expenditures and substantially reduced
government transfers, such as pensions, early retirement beneﬁts, housing subsidies, and
social and unemployment insurance. Moreover, cuts across on a broad range of spending
programs were implemented between 1994 and 2000. Some revenue measures were also
introduced, including increases in social security fees, full taxation of dividends and cap-
ital gains, and increases in personal income tax rates. Hauptmeier et al. (2006) report
that since mid-1995, "the government gradually implemented a pension reform and in-
troduced a funded pillar, besides pursuing a privatization program and a higher degree
of labour market liberalization".
Sweden, as was the case for Canada and Finland, is a case of expenditure-based
ﬁscal adjustment with re-election. In the September 1994 general election the Social
13Democratic Party won most seats, although not an overall majority, and Ingvar Carlsson
returned to power at the head of a minority government after a center-right minority
government had won the previous elections in the early 1990s. In August of 1995 Carlsson
announced that he would step down as prime minister in March 1996, once his party had
chosen a replacement. In the meanwhile, a referendum was passed in November 1994
supporting Sweden’s application for entering the European Union (EU), and in January
1995 Sweden became a full EU member.
Göran Persson, the former Sweden ﬁnance minister, replaced Carlsson as prime min-
ister in March 1996 and continued the austerity measures that started at the beginning
of the 1990s. Although the ﬁscal adjustment was quite signiﬁcant as dicussed above
Persson’s Social Democrats ﬁnished ahead in the September 1998 general election, al-
though its share of votes decreased by 7 percent to 38 percent. The votes for the Social
Democratic Party were lost to the ex-communist Left Party, which doubled its vote to
12 percent between 1994 and 1998, and which supported the government conditional on
it raising welfare spending and holding a referendum to join the Euro. Between 1998 and
2002, the economy started growing again, which enabled tax cuts and led to the Social
Democratic victory in the following general elections in 2002. The Social Democrats held
oﬃce until 2006.
6.4 United Kingdom 1994-1999: Expenditure-Based Adjustment
without Government Re-election
On September 16, 1992, the Prime Minister Major was forced to withdraw the pound
from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism because the British government could
not maintain the value of the currency at agreed-upon levels. In early 1993, ther
was positve growth driven by an increase in private consumption. Unemploymeny
fell over the following years, while inﬂation remained relatively low. At the same time
austerity measures were implemented, mostly through expenditure cuts. Using our data,
we estimate that the United Kingdom experienced a cumulative decline in the ratio of
deﬁcit to GDP of 6.7 percentage points between 1994 and 1999, and that almost 60
percent of the ﬁscal adjustment was due to expenditure cuts. Expenditure measures
mainly consisted of sustantial cuts in government consumption, public employment and
transfers. They also implemented cuts in defense, transport and social beneﬁts (by
setting tighter eligibility criteria). On the revenue side the austerity program included
increases in indirect taxes and some duties. However "The VAT was lowered on some
items for equity reasons, advanced corporation tax rebates were abolished, and there
was a small reduction in the corporate tax rate" (Leigh et al. 2007). Complementary
measures were also implemented, and they included establishing the independence of
the Bank of England, reforming the tax systems, in particular in the area of corporate
taxation, and social contributions especially in the low-wage sector. Moreover legislation
on corporate governance and competition was improved, and the utilities sector was
substantially reformed by changing regulations.
In the election of 1997 the Conservative Party lost and the Labour Party took oﬃce.
It should be remembered tat after three consecutive victories, the Conservative Party
won again in 1992, but this time by a narrower margin: the Tory majority in 1992 was
reduced from over a hundred seats to below thirty. In addition the economic credibility
of the government was seriously undermined a few months after the election, when Major
was forced to withdraw the pound from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
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In this paper we have examined in some details the evidence supporting the conventional
wisdom that ﬁscally "tight" governments loose popularity and elections and ﬁscally ex-
pansionary ones win. We found surprisingly little evidence supporting this conventional
wisdom given the strenght with which this view is held by politicians, commentators,
political scientists and economists. More precisely we found no evidence that even large
reductions of budget deﬁcits are associated always ( or most of the times) with electoral
losses .
The biggest counter argument is one of reverse causation, namely strong and popular
government can implement ﬁscal adjustment and be reelected "despite" such policies,
thus only these government do so. Our attempts to uncover these reverse causation does
not provide convincing evidence that our result are only driven by this eﬀect. Needless
to say it is diﬃcult to measure "strength" of a government, ex ante, and therefore our
test should be taken cautiously. But we believe that a cautious conclusion is warranted:
reasonably solid governments not on the verge of losing an election anyway can engage
in ﬁscal adjustments, even aggressive ones and survive the next election.
Three case studies of sharp ﬁscal adjustments (Canada, Finland and Sweden) show
a decline in political support for the government, but a strong recovery later on. In the
case of the UK the political revieval did not occur and a very unpopular John Major
lost.
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8.1 National Accounts Data
Fiscal and macroeconomic data are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Database
no.84. In our analysis we focus on the period 1975-2008. Variables we use in our study
are deﬁned as follows:
CHEXP : Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of pri-
mary expenditures to GDP. Primary expenditures are computed as government current
disbursements less gross government interest payments.
CHREV : Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public
revenues to GDP. Public revenues are computed as governement current receipts less
gross governemnt interest receipts.
CHDEF : Change in public deﬁcit: percentage point change in the ratio of public
deﬁcit to GDP. Calculated as  less 
CHTRF : Change in transfers to households: percentage point change in the ratio of
transfers to households to GDP.
CHSUB : Change in subsidies: percentage point change in the ratio of subsidies to
GDP.
COCHEXP : Change in government expenditures (), corrected for the cy-
cle: percentage point change in the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary expenditures to
potential GDP.
COCHREV : Change in government revenues (), corrected for the cycle: per-
centage point change in the ratio of cyclically adjusted government revenues to potential
GDP.
COCHDEF : Change in the primary deﬁcit (), corrected for the cycle: cal-
culated as  less .
TOTCHDEF : Average change in deﬁcit during tenure: average percentage point
change in the deﬁcit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the
current year. That is the average of  for the years from the last termination up
to the current year.
∆GDP : Rate of growth of real GDP, percent. Computed as the percentage change of
the variable "Gross domestic product, volume, at 2000 ppp".
∆TOTGDP : Average growth during tenure: average growth rate from the time when
a cabinet came to power, up to current year, percent.
∆GDPG7:Growth of G7 countries: weighted average growth rate of the G7 countries,
percent. Weights for each country are calculated using real GDP.
∆GDPg7:Growth relative to the G7 countries: calculated as ∆ less ∆7.
UNR : Unemployment rate, percent.
∆UNR : Growth of the unemployment rate, percent: [(−1) − 1] ∗ 100.
∆TOTUNR: Average unemployment growth during tenure: average annual growth
rate of unemployment rate from beginning of cabinet’s tenure to current year, percent.
UNRg7:Unemployment rate relative to the G7 countries: unemployment rate less the
GDP-weighted average of the G7 unemployment rate, percentage points.
INFL : Inﬂation: rate of change of the GDP deﬂator, percent. It is constucted using
the variable "Gross domestic product, deﬂator, market prices".
TOTINFL: Average inﬂation during tenure: average rate of inﬂation from the begin-
ning of cabinet’s tenure to current year, percent.
INFLg7:Inﬂation rate relative to the G7 countries: inﬂation rate less the GDP-
weighted average of the G7 inﬂation rate, percentage points.
16PEXP : Spending-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two
conditions hold:
a .t h e r ei sal a r g ea d j u s t m e n t(   -1 . 5 ) ;
b.  is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
PTAX : Tax-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two condi-
tions hold:
a .t h e r ei sal a r g ea d j u s t m e n t(   -1 . 5 ) ;
b.  is more than its median across all years in which a large adjustment
occurs.
PTRF : Transfer-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two
conditions hold:
a .t h e r ei sal a r g ea d j u s t m e n t(   -1 . 5 ) ;
b.  is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs.
PCGW : Government wage-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when the
following two conditions hold:
a .t h e r ei sal a r g ea d j u s t m e n t(   1.5);
b.  is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment
occurs.
NINTRTg7:Relative nominal interest rate: long term nominal interest rate (ten-
year treasury notes) of a given country less the GDP-weighted average of long nominal
interest rates in the G7 countries, percentage points.
RINTRT : Real interest rate: ten-year interest rate minus the growth rate of the GDP
deﬂator, percent.
RINTRTg7:Relative real interest rate: ten-year real interest rate of a given country
less the GDP-weighted average of real interest rates in the G7 countries.
8.2 Cabinet data
For cabinet data we use the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2009. Again, we
cover the period 1975-2008. The cabinet variables we focus on are deﬁned as follows:
TERM : Government termination: dummy variable equal to 1 in any year in which
a government ends, regardless of the reason. A termination may or may not involve a
"change" in cabinet ideology or prime minister.
DURAT : Duration: integer number of years that a cabinet has been in power, up to
the current year. A cabinet that falls during its ﬁrst year in power is counted as 1. Every
time there is a government termination ( =1 ),  is reset to 1 the year
after the termination.
SING : Single party: dummy variable equal to 1 if a single party cabinet is in power.
COAL : Coalition: dummy variable equal to 1 if a coalition cabinet (including ministers
from two or more parties) is in power.
MAJ : Majority: dummy variable equal to 1 if the cabinet has majority support in
parliament.
17IDEOCH : Change in ideology of cabinet: dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a
change in the ideology index between the current year and the next. It is constructed
by exploiting the change in the value of variable  (describing the ideology
of the chief executive’s party) in the DPI dataset.
ALLCH : Change of ideology or prime minister; dummy variable equal to 1 if either
 or  is equal to 1.
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Table 1 – 10 periods with largest cumulative fiscal adjustment (cyclically adjusted variables) 
   
                     





















% OF FISCAL ADJ. 
DUE TO CUT IN 
EXPENDITURES  TERM 
CHANGE IN 
IDEOLOGY 
DENMARK  1983-86  4  -2.43  -0.85  1.58  -9.74  -2.43  35.03  2  0 
GREECE  1990-94  5  -1.88  -0.50  1.38  -9.39  -1.88  26.38  2  1 
SWEDEN  1994-2000  7  -1.20  -0.81  0.38  -8.38  -1.20  67.91  3  0 
BELGIUM  1982-87  6  -1.26  -0.96  0.30  -7.57  -1.26  76.50  2  0 
CANADA  1993-97  5  -1.36  -1.25  0.11  -6.80  -1.36  91.80  1  0 
UNITED KINGDOM  1994-99  6  -1.12  -0.66  0.47  -6.72  -1.12  58.45  1  1 
FINLAND  1993-98  6  -1.04  -0.81  0.23  -6.23  -1.04  78.13  2  1 
PORTUGAL  1982-84  3  -1.89  -1.14  0.75  -5.67  -1.89  60.16  2  2 
ITALY  1990-93  4  -1.24  0.13  1.36  -4.95  -1.24  -10.21  2  1 
IRELAND  1986-89  4  -1.21  -1.54  -0.33  -4.82  -1.21  127.50  2  1 
 








Figure 1 – Frequency in cabinet changes and fiscal adjustments  
 


















Figure 2 - Frequency in changes of cabinet ideology and fiscal adjustments  
 


















Figure 3 - Frequency in changes of cabinet ideology and cabinet changes given expenditure/tax based adjustments 
 















Tax based adjustments 
Table 2 - Probit coefficients (full sample) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
                 
CHDEF
1  -0.0627 
(0.052) 
COCHDEF
2  0.0039 
(0.056) 
TOTCHDEF
3  -0.0100 
(0.067) 
CHEXP
4  -0.0344 
(0.063) 
CHREV
5  0.0551 
(0.061) 
DGDP  -0.0471  -0.0439  -0.1039**  -0.0499  -0.0320 
(0.042)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.042) 
DUNR  0.0009  -0.0030  -0.0066  -0.0007  -0.0005 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
INFL  0.0266**  0.0342**  0.0309**  0.0301**  0.0265** 
(0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
DURAT  0.2265***  0.2273***  0.2295***  0.2246***  0.2256*** 
(0.050)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
COAL  0.0547  0.0493  0.0450  0.0626  0.0644 
(0.150)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.150)  (0.150) 
MAJ  0.0039  -0.0154  -0.0467  -0.0083  0.0084 
(0.178)  (0.182)  (0.179)  (0.178)  (0.178) 
Constant  -1.7700***  -1.8006***  -1.6166***  -1.7657***  -1.8195*** 
(0.230)  (0.242)  (0.237)  (0.234)  (0.230) 
Log-likelihood 
Observations  613  591  613  614  613 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
3. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
4. Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP. 
5. Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. 
When TOTCHDEF is used, given variables are replaced by dTOTGDP, dTOTUNR and TOTINFL. The coefficients on DGDP , DUNR and INFL are the coefficients on these variables. 
 
 
 Table 3 - Probit coefficients (full sample), with additional controls 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
                 
CHDEF
1  -0.0663 
(0.053) 
COCHDEF
2  0.0125 
(0.058) 
TOTCHDEF
3  -0.0210 
(0.070) 
CHEXP
4  -0.0325 
(0.068) 
CHREV
5  0.0619 
(0.062) 
DGDP  -0.0857  -0.0688  -0.1545**  -0.0820  -0.0603 
(0.060)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.064)  (0.059) 
DUNR  0.0010  -0.0026  -0.0075  -0.0007  0.0000 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
INFL  0.0308*  0.0425**  0.0302*  0.0344**  0.0332** 
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
DURAT  0.2241***  0.2259***  0.2236***  0.2221***  0.2231*** 
(0.050)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
COAL  0.0688  0.0666  0.0648  0.0787  0.0789 
(0.152)  (0.156)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.152) 
MAJ  0.0001  -0.0282  -0.0428  -0.0125  0.0017 
(0.179)  (0.183)  (0.180)  (0.179)  (0.179) 
DGDPg7  0.0520  0.0369  0.0640  0.0439  0.0420 
(0.055)  (0.058)  (0.049)  (0.055)  (0.054) 
UNRg7  0.0128  0.0199  0.0131  0.0144  0.0151 
(0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
INFLg7  -0.0056  -0.0141  0.0107  -0.0052  -0.0138 
(0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
Constant  -1.6840***  -1.7501***  -1.5306***  -1.7003***  -1.7466*** 
(0.260)  (0.271)  (0.266)  (0.265)  (0.257) 
  
Log-likelihood  
Observations  613  591  613  614  613 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
3. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
4. Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP. 
5. Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. 
When TOTCHDEF is used, given variables are replaced by dTOTGDP, dTOTUNR and TOTINFL. The coefficients on DGDP , DUNR and INFL are the coefficients on these variables. 
 Table 4 - Probit coefficients (using only observations with CHDEF<0) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
                 
CHDEF
1  -0.1454 
(0.108) 
COCHDEF
2  -0.0570 
(0.105) 
TOTCHDEF
3  0.0281 
(0.130) 
CHEXP
4  0.0608 
(0.101) 
CHREV
5  0.2104* 
(0.109) 
DGDP  -0.0249  -0.0515  -0.0701  -0.0077  0.0166 
(0.060)  (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
DUNR  0.0098  -0.0035  0.0070  0.0078  0.0061 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
INFL  0.0232  0.0331*  0.0273  0.0295  0.0191 
(0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
DURAT  0.1666**  0.1550**  0.1182  0.1624**  0.1691** 
(0.072)  (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.072)  (0.073) 
COAL  0.1158  0.0903  0.1036  0.1374  0.1236 
(0.214)  (0.217)  (0.216)  (0.213)  (0.214) 
MAJ  -0.0443  -0.0557  -0.0944  -0.0554  -0.0003 
(0.268)  (0.270)  (0.268)  (0.266)  (0.267) 
Constant  -1.8521***  -1.6941***  -1.4695***  -1.7634***  -1.9791*** 
(0.351)  (0.389)  (0.378)  (0.341)  (0.364) 
Log-likelihood 
Observations  325  316  325  325  325 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
3. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
4. Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP. 
5. Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. 






 Table 5 - Probit coefficients (full sample, non-cyclically adjusted variables) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
              
CHDEF
1  -0.0907  -0.0444  -0.0812  -0.0697 
(0.057)  (0.060)  (0.056)  (0.059) 
DGDP  -0.0450  -0.0438  -0.0463  -0.0478 
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
DUNR  0.0016  0.0007  0.0014  0.0010 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
INFL  0.0251*  0.0255*  0.0252*  0.0266** 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
DURAT  0.2256***  0.2277***  0.2254***  0.2270*** 
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
COAL  0.0530  0.0479  0.0532  0.0557 
(0.151)  (0.151)  (0.150)  (0.150) 
MAJ  -0.0041  0.0033  0.0002  0.0035 
(0.178)  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.178) 
PEXP
2  -0.4227 
(0.340) 
PTAX
3  0.1798 
(0.292) 
PTRF
4  -0.3040 
(0.347) 
PCGW
5  -0.0753 
(0.297) 
Constant  -1.7427***  -1.7839***  -1.7468***  -1.7655*** 
(0.232)  (0.231)  (0.232)  (0.231) 
Log-likelihood 
Observations  613  613  613  613 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Spending-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold: (a) there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < - 1.5); (b) CHEXP is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs. 
3. Tax-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold: (a)  there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < - 1.5); (b) CHREV is more than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs. 
4. Transfer-based adjustment: dummy variable equal to 1 when following two conditions hold: (a) there is a large adjustment (CHDEF < - 1.5); (b) CHTRF is less than its median across all years in which a large adjustment occurs. 





 Table 6 (same variables as table 3) - Logit fixed effects model coefficients (full sample)  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
  
         
CHDEF
















5  0.1047 
 
(0.119) 
DGDP  -0.1638  -0.1224  -0.3396***  -0.1728  -0.1159 
 
(0.114)  (0.116)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.112) 
DUNR  0.0034  -0.0022  -0.0095  -0.0004  0.0016 
 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
INFL  0.0113  0.0407  -0.0034  0.0168  0.0284 
 
(0.047)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.045) 
DURAT  0.5246***  0.5401***  0.5410***  0.5244***  0.5221*** 
  (0.101)  (0.106)  (0.105)  (0.101)  (0.101) 
COAL  0.0497  0.1209  -0.0311  0.0320  0.0269 
 
(0.406)  (0.415)  (0.410)  (0.406)  (0.407) 
MAJ  -0.3609  -0.3537  -0.4716  -0.3877  -0.3539 
 
(0.433)  (0.435)  (0.435)  (0.434)  (0.434) 
DGDPg7  0.0716  0.0681  0.0909  0.0589  0.0630 
 
(0.104)  (0.110)  (0.091)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
UNRg7  0.0252  0.0784  0.0067  0.0237  0.0435 
 
(0.059)  (0.063)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.058) 
INFLg7  0.0484  0.0368  0.0917  0.0535  0.0212 
 
(0.072)  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.072) 
Log-likelihood 
Observations  580  558  580  581  580 
Number of countries  18  18  18  18  18 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
3. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
4. Change in public expenditures: percentage point change in the ratio of primary expenditures to GDP. 
5. Change in public revenues: percentage point change in the ratio of public revenues to GDP. 
When TOTCHDEF is used, given variables are replaced by dTOTGDP, dTOTUNR and TOTINFL. The coefficients on DGDP , DUNR and INFL are the coefficients on these variables. 
 
  
Table 7 – Fiscal adjustments using different definitions of executive  
 
N° OF OBSERVATIONS 
(1975-2008) 
(a) 
N° OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS 
(1975-2008) 
(b) 
N° OF LARGE FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS 
(1975-2008) 
(c)  % (b)/(a)  % (c)/(a) 
AVERAGE COCHDEF 
(1975-2008) 
NO ABSOLUTE MAJORITY  465  229  47  49.2%  10.1%  -0.00794 
ABSOLUTE MAJORITY  127  62  13  48.8%  10.2%  0.1465567 
SINGLE PARTY  253  130  26  51.4%  10.3%  0.0291018 
COALITION OF PARTIES  347  164  34  47.3%  9.8%  0.0296184 
 












Figure 4 – Frequency in cabinet changes and fiscal adjustments  (Single party/Coalition) 
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Figure 5 - Frequency in changes of cabinet ideology and fiscal adjustments (Single party/Coalition) 
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Figure 6  – Frequency in cabinet changes and fiscal adjustments ( Majority/No Majority) 
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Majority governments No majority governmentsFigure 7 - Frequency in changes of cabinet ideology and fiscal adjustments ( Majority/No Majority) 
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Majority governments No majority governmentsTable 8 - Probit coefficients (Coalition interaction term) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
                          CHDEF
1  -0.0627  -0.0817 
  (0.052)  (0.077) 
CHDEF*COAL
2  0.0311 
  (0.093) 
COCHDEF
3  0.0039  -0.0321 
  (0.056)  (0.083) 
COCHDEF*COAL
4  0.0652 
  (0.110) 
TOTCHDEF
5  -0.0100  -0.0284 
  (0.067)  (0.094) 
TOTCHDEF*COAL
6  0.0321 
  (0.116) 
DGDP  -0.0471  -0.0470  -0.0439  -0.0426  -0.1039**  -0.1032** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
DUNR  0.0009  0.0010  -0.0030  -0.0028  -0.0066  -0.0066 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
INFL  0.0266**  0.0269**  0.0342**  0.0347**  0.0309**  0.0313** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
DURAT  0.2265***  0.2286***  0.2273***  0.2299***  0.2295***  0.2314*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
COAL  0.0547  0.0562  0.0493  0.0483  0.0450  0.0450 
  (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.154)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.152) 
MAJ  0.0039  0.0059  -0.0154  -0.0107  -0.0467  -0.0477 
  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.179)  (0.179) 
Constant  -1.7700***  -1.7789***  -1.8006***  -1.8141***  -1.6166***  -1.6266*** 
  (0.230)  (0.232)  (0.242)  (0.244)  (0.237)  (0.240) 
    Log-likelihood 
Observations  613  613  591  591  613  613 
Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Interaction variable interacting CHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for coalition governments. 
3. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
4. Interaction variable interacting COCHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for coalition governments. 
5. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
6. Interaction variable interacting TOTCHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for coalition governments. 
When TOTCHDEF is used, given variables are replaced by dTOTGDP, dTOTUNR and TOTINFL. The coefficients on DGDP , DUNR and INFL are the coefficients on these variables. 
 
 
 Table 9 - Probit coefficients (Majority interaction term) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
                                  CHDEF
1  -0.0627  -0.0400 
  (0.052)  (0.057) 
CHDEF*MAJ
2  -0.1122 
  (0.121) 
COCHDEF
3  0.0039  0.0469 
  (0.056)  (0.065) 
COCHDEF*MAJ
4  -0.1696 
  (0.129) 
TOTCHDEF
5  -0.0100  0.0414 
  (0.067)  (0.075) 
TOTCHDEF*MAJ
6  -0.2348 
  (0.156) 
DGDP  -0.0471  -0.0453  -0.0439  -0.0413  -0.1039**  -0.0971** 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
DUNR  0.0009  0.0005  -0.0030  -0.0033  -0.0066  -0.0075 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
INFL  0.0266**  0.0273**  0.0342**  0.0346**  0.0309**  0.0321** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
DURAT  0.2265***  0.2310***  0.2273***  0.2328***  0.2295***  0.2355*** 
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
COAL  0.0547  0.0550  0.0493  0.0446  0.0450  0.0580 
  (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.154)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.153) 
MAJ  0.0039  0.0101  -0.0154  -0.0050  -0.0467  -0.0400 
  (0.178)  (0.178)  (0.182)  (0.182)  (0.179)  (0.181) 
Constant  -1.7700***  -1.7879***  -1.8006***  -1.8216***  -1.6166***  -1.6638*** 
  (0.230)  (0.232)  (0.242)  (0.244)  (0.237)  (0.240) 
        Log-likelihood 
Observations  613  613  591  591  613  613 
  Source: see data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1. Change in public deficit: percentage point change in the ratio of public deficit to GDP. 
2. Interaction variable interacting CHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for governments with majority support in parliament. 
3. Change in the primary deficit (CHDEF), corrected for the cycle. 
4. Interaction variable interacting COCHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for governments with majority support in parliament. 
5. Average change in deficit during tenure: average percentage point change in the deficit over the years that the current cabinet has been in power, up to the current year. 
6. Interaction variable interacting TOTCHDEF and a dummy variable controlling for governments with majority support in parliament. 










Table 10: Vote Shares and Seats by Election in Canada 1993-2000 
 














Seats  Percentage 
Share of Votes  Seats 
              
Liberal Party of Canada   41.3  177   38.5  155  40.8  172   -2.8  2.3 
Bloc Québécois   13.5  54   10.7  44  10.7  38   -2.8  0 
Reform Party of Canada   18.7  52   19.4  60  25.5  66   0.7  6.1 
New Democratic Party   6.9  9   11  21  8.5  13   4.1  -2.5 
Progressive Conservative 
Party of Canada  
16  2   18.8  20  12.2  12   2.8  -6.6 
Others   3.6  1  1.6  1   2.3  0   -2  0.7 
 















Table 11: Vote Shares and Seats by Election in Finland 1995-2003 
 
1995  1999  2003 
Change in share 
1999-1995 















Social Democratic Party of 
Finland 
28.3  63  22.9  51  24.5  53  -5.4  1.6 
Centre Party  19.8  44  22.4  48  24.7  55  2.6  2.3 
National Coalition Party  17.9  39  21  46  18.6  40  3.1  -2.4 
Left Alliance  11.2  22  10.9  20  9.9  19  -0.3  -1 
Swedish People's Party  5.1  11  5.1  11  4.6  8  0  -0.5 
Green League  6.5  9  7.3  11  8  14  0.8  0.7 
Christian League of Finland  3  7  4.2  10  5.3  7  1.2  1.1 
Progressive Finnish Party  2.8  2  1  0  -  -  -  - 
Finnish Rural Party   1.3  1  -  0  -  -  -  - 
Others  4.1  2  5.2  3  4.4  4  1.1  -0.8 
 












Table 12: Vote Shares and Seats by Election in Sweden 1994-2002 
 
  1994  1998  2002 
Change in share 
1998-1994 















                      
Moderate Party  22.4  80  22.9  82  15.3  55  0.5  -7.6 
Centre Party  7.7  27  5.1  18  6.2  22  -2.6  1.1 
Liberal Party  7.2  26  4.7  17  13.4  48  -2.5  8.7 
Christian Democratic Party  4.1  15  11.7  42  9.1  33  7.6  -2.6 
Green Party  5  18  4.5  16  4.6  17  -0.5  0.1 
Social Democratic Party   45.3  161  36.4  131  39.9  144  -8.9  3.5 
Left Party  6.2  22  12  43  8.4  30  5.8  -3.6 
Others  2.3  -  2.6  -  3.1  -  0.3  0.5 
 

















Table 13: Vote Shares and Seats by Election in the UK 1992-1997 
     
1992  1997 











            
Labour  34.4  274  43.2  418  8.8 
Conservative  41.9  343  30.7  165  -11.2 
Liberal Democratic  17.8  18  16.8  46  -1 
Others   5.9  24  9.3  30  3.4 
 
Source: UK Parliament 